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Jeremy Corbyn’s recent speech purported to set out how Labour would approach the ongoing Brexit 
negotiations.  The speech appears to have had three major aims.  Firstly, it sought to criticise the 
incumbent government.  Additionally, Corbyn attempted to present Labour as an alternative 
“government in waiting” with its own Brexit agenda and policies.  Finally, it sought to drive a wedge 
between different factions of the governing Conservative party. 
Much of the speech was largely unrelated to Brexit in the strictest sense.  Domestic policy stood first 
and foremost, with Corbyn criticising ongoing “austerity” policies and calling for greater public 
spending, particularly on health.  He also alluded to a desire to re-nationalise the railways, water 
industry, energy and others.  Present Labour policy also intends to tax those on high incomes more 
heavily.  Mention was also made of foreign policy objectives and a move away from the use of force. 
Corbyn discussed his desire to maintain or enhance environmental standards, consumer protections 
and a cornucopia of other regulations.  In almost every case, Brexit is unlikely to either preclude or 
facilitate implementation of these.  European legislation does present a floor in terms of standards, 
but this should be seen as a minimum and there would be nothing to stop a Labour government 
going beyond them if desired. 
During that part of the speech that did focus specifically on Brexit, a substantial portion appeared to 
relate to putting a different political spin on what amounted to the same aims and objectives as the 
governing party.  In particular, it appears that Labour and the Conservatives largely agree on citizens’ 
rights, a transition period and a desire to avoid a border on the Island of Ireland.  Evidence at 
present suggests that it might be easier for Labour to achieve these, purely because there is less 
pressure to strike independent trade deals and they appear much more open to a relatively lax 
immigration policy. 
Indeed in many regards, for all the political optics, Corbyn’s approach appears to bear a striking 
resemblance to that of Theresa May’s government.  His assertion of the importance of a “global 
perspective” and repetition of the well-worn phrase “[w]e are leaving the European Union but we 
are not leaving Europe” underlines this.  Similarly, there appear similarities between Corbyn’s 
criticism of the “global elite” and Theresa May’s so-called “citizens of nowhere”.   
Nevertheless, in spite of these similarities real differences are emerging between the two major 
parties on Brexit.  Ultimately, both parties are struggling to interpret the referendum result – leaving 
the EU can mean dramatically different things – and this has led to internal inconsistencies and 
contradictions.  Interestingly, whilst Corbyn was dismissive of “making up numbers and parading 
them on the side of a bus” went on to state that, “we will use funds returned from Brussels after 
Brexit to invest in our public services”.  In spite of the absence of either a bus or specific numbers, 
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these do appear to be the same thing – namely an argument that money will be “freed up” as a 
result of Brexit.  Insofar as one accepts the prognostications of a majority of economists (and 
others), who argue that Brexit will reduce economic output, it would appear that Brexit is likely to 
reduce funding for public services rather than increasing it. 
Similarly, Corbyn’s stated desire to negotiate “to support individual EU agencies, rather than paying 
more to duplicate those agencies here” appears to rule-in continued payments to the EU.  Doing so 
would inevitably further reduce those funds that Labour wish to repatriate from Brussels in order to 
“invest in our public services”.  There are a number of more minor alterations to government policy 
– notably reversing the decision to leave Euratom – which appear sensible and pragmatic.  Similar 
moves might be sensible with respect to Open Skies policies and a number of other international 
collaborative efforts. 
Corbyn’s point that “[e]very country, whether it’s Turkey, Switzerland, or Norway that is 
geographically close to the EU, without being an EU member state has some sort of close 
relationship to the EU” is one that we’re familiar with at the Centre for Brexit Studies.  Nevertheless, 
his assertion that “Labour would seek a final deal that gives full access to European markets and 
maintains the benefits of the single market and the customs union” looks an awful lot like having 
one’s cake and eating it. 
The flagship policy announcement of the speech was Labour’s stated desire for a customs union as a 
matter of policy.  Whilst domestic politics was undoubtedly a major part of this – a number of 
Conservative MPs are known to have a favourable view of such an option and it is entirely possible 
that such a policy would have majority support within the House of Commons.  This could cause 
considerable difficulties for Theresa May’s government on several issues. 
The broader ramifications of Labour’s stated policy, if it were adopted, are likely to be felt in several 
areas.  As with many aspects of the ongoing negotiations and future relationship, the devil is likely to 
be in the details and, fundamentally, Britain will be constrained by what the EU is prepared to offer.  
Labour appears to support withdrawing from the European Economic Area, as evidenced by 
Corbyn’s statement that “Labour would not countenance a deal that left Britain as a passive 
recipient of rules decided elsewhere by others.” 
In several areas, Labour’s stated intentions remain somewhat fuzzy (as, in fairness, do those of the 
government).  This is clear in statements like, “[a] new customs arrangement would depend on 
Britain being able to negotiate agreement of new trade deals in our national interest.”  If that means 
independent trade deals then it is physically impossible.  If it means the UK should have a joint say in 
negotiations then it’s theoretically feasible but would depend upon the acquiescence of the EU.  One 
clear question is what Britain would be prepared to offer in exchange for a role in policymaking and 
trade arrangements.  No country outside of the EU at present has this favourable position.  Labour 
has ruled out membership of the EEA and the EU Customs Union (EUCU), preferring in favour a 
customs union with the EU (which is what Turkey has).  Why would the EU be prepared to grant this 
to a third party? 
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Labour is seeking a far closer relationship than Turkey has – the UK would probably need to remain 
aligned with EU phytosanitary requirements in order to avoid an Irish border, for example.  Whilst 
technology should be able to help accelerate border crossings and reduce waiting times in customs, 
in the absence of a unified economic area (maintaining regulatory alignment and a common external 
tariff), it is unlikely that crossing the international border will be as frictionless as travelling between 
Camden and Islington. 
More generally, Corbyn wishes to negotiate opt-outs from certain areas and directives (such as the 
Posted Workers Directive).  It is unclear that leaving the EU is necessarily needed for this – the UK 
has already negotiated opt-outs from aspects of the Working Time Directive, for example.  Similarly, 
most of Corbyn’s proposed nationalisations would be feasible within the EU – state-owned SNCF and 
Deutsche Bahn operate the vast majority of passenger train services in France and Germany 
respectively.  As is the case for the governing Conservative party, it is highly improbable that the EU 
would permit the “cherry picking” of those aspects of membership that the UK government finds 
convenient. 
Finally, two aspects of the Labour party’s proposals are of interest.  There is a clear desire for 
ongoing regulatory alignment with the EU, and to a much greater extent than is true for the 
governing Conservative party.  It is unclear to what extent this is compatible with the notion of 
“taking back control”.  Similarly, the Labour party appears to be pursuing a notably liberal agenda 
with respect to migration.  Insofar as concerns over the extent and pace of immigration to the UK 
were a motivator for voting to leave the EU, this is an interesting direction to take. 
 
